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Abstract
Global agri-food companies such as Barilla and SABMiller are purchasing agricul-
tural products directly from farmers using different types of contracts to ensure stable
supply. We examine one such contract with partially-guaranteed prices (PGP). Under
a PGP contract, around sowing time, the buying firm agrees to purchase the crop
when harvested by the farmer, offering a guaranteed unit price for any fraction of the
produce and offering the commodity market price prevailing at the time of delivery
for the remainder. The farmer then chooses the fraction. By analyzing a Stackelberg
game, we show (1) how the PGP contract creates mutual benefits when the firm’s pur-
chase quantity is taken as being exogenous. We also analyze how the PGP contract is
robust in creating value for both the firm and the farmer (2) when the firm’s purchase
quantity is endogenously determined; (3) when the firm provides advisory services to
the farmer; and (4) when the firm offers a price premium as an incentive for farmers
to exert efforts to comply with ‘sustainable’ agricultural practices.
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1 Introduction
Farmers in both developing and developed countries face huge and possibly growing price
uncertainty. For instance, the price of Arabica coffee price hit record price at over US$3
per pound in 2011, dropped to US$1 per pound in 2013 and then rebounded to US$1.80 by
the of May in 2014 (Josephs, 2013; 2014; also Danby and Sellen 2010). When the wheat
price surged at end 2007, many farmers in the Emilia Romagna region of Italy focused on
growing durum wheat (Formentini et al. 2014). However, when the price of wheat collapsed
in 2009, many farmers began to move away from wheat cultivation. Similarly, in 2015, many
Chinese dairy farmers poured away milk and slaughtered cows as milk prices collapsed after
the boom two years earlier (Yap, 2015). Dealing with price risk faced by farmers is therefore
an important issue (cf. Broll et al. 2013).
Contract farming is growing as a way to mitigate demand uncertainty for the farmer
and supply uncertainty for the buyers as well as a way to improve traceability in the supply
chain (cf. Aiello et al. 2015; see Belavina and Girotra 2015 for relationship sourcing in
general). Agri-food firms including manufacturers and retailers are increasingly purchasing
directly from farmers to reduce risk and improve returns for both sides. Some of these
firms also provide advisory services to farmers. One such company, Barilla, uses a particular
type of contract with farmers, which we call the Partially-Guaranteed-Price (PGP) contract
(Formentini et al. 2014); beverages giant SABMiller also has similar purchasing contracts.
This paper analyzes how such direct purchase contracts create value for the firm and
the farmer. We assume the familiar setting of a buyer-seller contract between a risk-neutral
buyer, i.e., the agri-food company, and a risk-averse supplier, i.e., the farmer who is typically
but not always a smallholder. Under the basic PGP contract, around sowing time, the buying
firm agrees to purchase the entire crop q harvested by the farmer (who has already set the
production quantity in advance of signing such contracts). The firm offers a guaranteed unit
price g for any proportion of his crop with the remaining quantity priced at the market price
prevailing at the time of delivery; the farmer then selects this proportion α as part of the
contract.
Our analysis shows that (1) the PGP contract creates extra supply chain surplus for the
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farmer as well as for the buying firm relative to simply using the market; this result continues
to hold when the buying firm imposes an upper bound on α or when the farmer can set his
production quantity q in anticipation of the PGP contract. Furthermore, we analyze the
PGP contract in a variety of settings arising from practice, including: (2) when the firm’s
purchase quantity y is endogenously determined; (3) when the firm provides advisory services
to the farmer; and (4) when the firm offers a price premium as an incentive for farmers to
exert efforts to comply with certain sustainable agricultural practices. Thus, our analysis
provides an economic rationale for agri-food firms like Barilla and SABMiller offering PGP
contracts as well as advisory services to farmers. We show how the well-understood dynamics
between risk-averse sellers and risk-neutral buyers play out in the agri-food domain, and with
mutual benefits that are robust across a variety of extensions in practice.
Our paper primarily contributes to the emerging literature on socially responsible oper-
ations (Zhou and Tang, 2012; Sodhi and Tang 2014; and Sodhi 2015) especially regarding
large agri-food firms buying directly from farmers. Examples are Indian FMCG company,
ITC, buying soya bean from farmers (cf. Devalkar et al. 2011), Nestle buying coffee beans
(Alvarez et al. 2010), Starbucks buying coffee beans (Lee et al., 2013; 2007) and Walmart
buying fruits and vegetables (Yeh and Tang 2013). The agri-food sector in general (cf. Ahu-
mada and Villalobos, 2009) and contract farming in the developing world in particular is
gaining considerable interest (Goyal 2010). There is also a strand focusing on advisory ser-
vices provided to the farmer by third parties (Berdegue and Marchant 2002; Swanson 2008;
Gakuru et al. 2009; Fafchamps and Minten 2012; and Tang et al. 2014). Our paper con-
tributes in three ways: (1) Purchasing is essentially transactional in this literature whereas
we describe and analyze contracts (see Belavina and Girotra 2015 for relational sourcing); (2)
to our knowledge, not much analytical work has been carried out in the extant literature –
Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) underscore the need for analytical modeling in such contexts.
Our paper is a step towards meeting this need; (3) the literature thus far has not considered
the use of advisory services contractually as part of contract farming as we do with PGP
contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide motivation and
background based on Barilla. Section 3 provides the basic setup for our model for the case
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when the firm purchases directly from the farmer without partial guaranteed prices (i.e.,
without PGP). Section 4 presents the analysis of the basic PGP contract for the case when
the purchase quantity is exogenously given. Section 5 generalizes the basic PGP contract
for the case when the firm’s purchase quantity is endogenously determined. In Section 6,
we extend the model of the basic PGP contract to the case when the firm offers advisory
services to the farmer as part of the contract. In Section 7, we discuss the firm offering an
incentive to the farmer to comply with sustainable agricultural practices. We conclude with
some areas for further research in Section 8. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Motivation and Background
Examples of agri-food firms buying directly from farmers (as opposed to only from com-
modity markets) include Barilla’s ‘Good for you, good for the planet’ initiatives, Nestle´’s
‘Creating Shared Value’ programs, Starbucks’ ‘C.A.F.E.’ initiative and Walmart’s ‘Direct
Farm’ initiative (Lee et al. 2013, 2015; Lee 2007; Yeh and Tang 2013). Moreover, many
global agri-food companies offer agricultural advisory services to farmers from whom they
purchase especially in developing countries. For instance, under its “creating shared value”
initiative, Nestle´ works with coffee farmers to help them to reduce production cost by im-
proving their farming techniques. In the Sawi area of Thailand, Nestle´’s agronomists teach
farmers how to reduce the cost of fertilizers by using compost and drip irrigation. Nestle´
also teaches coffee farmers how to manage soil quality and pest control in an environmen-
tally sustainable manner (Lee et al. 2013; 2015). In Italy, Barilla provides advisory services
(e.g., weather forecast, phenology, seeding, crop development, fertilization, weeding, pesti-
cides, herbicides) to farmers to help them to reduce cost, increase yield, and reduce carbon
footprint.
Barilla uses PGP contracts with farmers as described in the previous section. SABMiller
uses a similar contract in Africa by agreeing to contract a certain quantity of sorghum in
Africa from the smallholder farmer (or a collective) during the sowing season at a guaranteed
unit price. The farmer then decides the fraction of his expected produce to pre-sell to
SABMiller at this price, with the remainder to be sold to SABMiller or in the open market
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at the market price after harvest (Bariyo and Evans, 2015). In practice, these contracts
have add-on requirements and incentives. For example, the PGP contracts adopted by
Barilla come with incentives and/or price premiums for the farmer following ‘sustainable’
agricultural practices. Starbucks’ ‘C.A.F.E.’ initiative offers similar incentives (Lee, 2007).
For the Italian market, Barilla used to purchase most of its durum wheat from Italy
and small quantities from other European countries such as France, Greece, and Spain.
Unfortunately, due to stagnant market price of wheat from 1990 to 2006, many Italian
farmers stopped growing durum wheat. For instance, after a peak in wheat production in
Emilia Romagna in 1991 with 490,000 tons, the overall production in that region fell below
100,000 tons in 2006, an 80% drop from the peak). As local supply dropped, Barilla had to
increase its purchase from the international wheat market, especially from North America,
to meet its sales in the Italian market. In 2013 and 2014, we conducted interviews with
Barilla’s purchasing managers to learn of Barilla’s contracts, and with consortium managers
representing farmers to understand farmers’ decisions and behavior. We refer the reader to
Formentini et al. (2014) for details.
Although Barilla could obtain sufficient supply of durum wheat internationally from, say,
Arizona, there are concerns regarding transportation cost, carbon and water footprint, as
well as regarding quality requirements on the wheat being free from GMO and having high
percentage of protein. To sustain stable supply of high quality durum wheat at stable price
and to encourage sustainable agricultural practices, the local government, farmer consortia
and Barilla decided to work together by using incentive contracts.
In the first direct purchase contract signed in 2006, Barilla committed to purchase 30,000
tons of durum wheat from the contract farmers. This contract reduced the farmer’s quantity
risk and enabled Barilla to secure more supply of wheat in the local region. The basic
contract price was primarily based on the local commodity market, Borsa Merci di Bologna.
The durum wheat price shot up in 2007 followed by a sharp drop in 2008, forcing some farmers
to exit the wheat market. In line with its strategy to procure more wheat domestically for
pasta sold in the Italian market, Barilla established a new contract with the farmers to
purchase 60,000 tons of durum wheat in 2009. Under the new contract, the contract price
was based on the market price plus a guaranteed additional price premium as an incentive.
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Recognizing the fact in 2009 that the guaranteed price premium essentially transferred all
the price risk to Barilla, the firm established the PGP contract.
Under the PGP contract in 2010, Barilla committed to purchase 80,000 metric tons of
wheat. As part of the contract, Barilla offered a guaranteed purchase price that is known
to the farmer during the sowing season (i.e., after the production quantity has already been
determined by the farmer in advance). In return, the farmer could choose the percentage
of the purchase quantity α to be priced at the guaranteed price and the rest (1− α) priced
at the market price prevailing upon delivery after harvest. The PGP contract reduced price
risk for the farmers. However, to limit its exposure to price risk, Barilla imposed an upper
limit each year on α so that α ≤ 0.3, say. We also learned from the representative from a
farmers’ consortium that the farmers would like Barilla to lift the upper limit to a higher
level, thus revealing their risk aversion. As a result, how to approach imposing an upper
limit, if any, on α is an open policy question within the company.
In 2013, pursuing “Good for you, good for the planet” corporate goals, Barilla extended
the PGP contract by offering additional premium of 30 Euros per ton if farmers adhered to
the guidelines for sustainable agricultural practices as specified by the web-based decision
support system GranoDuro (www.granoduro.net). By the end of 2014, 30% of the quantity
purchased from the farmers was produced according to these guidelines, and the company
hopes to achieve 100 percent compliance by 2020.
Barilla’s contracts have provided enough incentives for farmers to increase their wheat
production since 2006. By the end of 2012, Barilla managed to source 70% of its durum
wheat from Italy itself for the Italian market. As a result of this successful implementation
of the PGP contract and incentive for farmers to adopt sustainable agricultural practices,
Barilla has also managed to reduce its carbon footprint by 30%, reduce farmer’s production
cost by 30% and increase farmer’s production yield by 20%. In recognition of its efforts,
Barilla won the European CSR Award in 2013.
We seek to understand how PGP contracts with incentives and compliance requirements
help farmers and buying firms like Barilla.
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3 Model Preliminaries: Direct Purchase without PGP
Consider a farmer growing two crops with unit cost c, one with a price that is known at
the time of sowing to be k upon delivery after harvest and the other with a price that
is currently uncertain upon delivery. This latter crop (e.g., durum wheat for Barilla or
sorghum for SABMiller) has an (ex-ante) uncertain market price P that will become known
after harvest, where P ∼ N(µ, σ2).1 Faced with an uncertain market price, the risk-averse
farmer has to allocate land to either crop given his limited production capacity. Here, we
consider the case that the farmer sets his production quantity based on the assumption that
he will sell his entire crop in the open market and he does not know and will not anticipate
any buyer will offer any direct purchase contract (e.g., PGP contract).
3.1 The Overall Sequence of Decisions
Although this section is about direct purchase without PGP contracts, it would be worthwhile
to look at the overall contract process to understand the sequence of decisions (Figure 1):
1. At the beginning of the sowing season, the farmer evaluates the economic tradeoff
between two alternative crops and decides to produce q units for the crop that has
an ex-ante uncertain unit price P and produce (cap− q) units for the other crop that
with a stable unit price k. Essentially, the farmer sets his production quantity q by
assuming that the crop will be sold in the open market. In other words, we assume that
the farmer does not know and cannot anticipate a buyer will offer a direct purchase
contract (e.g., the PGP contract) at this point in time.
2. Upon observing the farmer’s production quantity q, the firm agrees to purchase y = q
units from the farmer with the remaining (r− q) units to be purchased from the open
market . At the same time, the firm offers the farmer a guaranteed unit price g. Hence,
the buyer will pay the farmer g per unit regardless of the realized market price so
that the farmer wins (loses) if g is above (below) the realized market price. Also,
1For tractability, it is commonly assumed that the market price P is normally distributed in the research
literature. Examples include Chen and Tang (2015) and the references therein. Also, the normal distribution
is a reasonable assumption because the market price forecast is often derived from linear regression models
so that µ is the forecasted price and σ2 represents the forecasting error.
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Figure 1: Timing associated with the PGP contract
the contract between Barilla and the farmer is overseen by the local government to
ensure compliance by both parties. In the long run, it could be argued that these
contracts are self-enforcing (cf. Kvaløy 2006). Under the direct PGP contract, the
farming process is tightly controlled by Barilla (which fertilizer and pesticide to use).
As such, there is little yield uncertainty and the farmer can effectively deliver q to the
buyer. Nevertheless, yield uncertainty can be important in other settings and worth
investigating as part of future research.
3. Given the guaranteed unit price g, the farmer selects the proportion α so that the
effective (ex-ante) unit selling price would be equal to αg+ (1−α)P . As mentioned in
Section 2, the buying firm may impose an upper limit on α to control the amount of
price risk the firm is willing to absorb from the farmer. For instance, Barilla imposed
an upper limit at 30% under its PGP contract in one year. Here we initially allow
α ∈ [0, 1] and deal with α ≤ b] for an upper limit as an extension, e.g., with b = 0.3.
4. After the harvest season, the market price P is realized and the payoff to each party
is determined accordingly.
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3.2 Farmer’s Decision on Production Quantity q
We assume the farmer first decides on allocating land across these two different crops, of
which the one with uncertain price is the commodity of interest for PGP contracts. In
our motivating example, Barilla is not obligated to offer any direct purchase contract and
continues to purchase in international commodity markets even for pasta for the Italian
market. As such, it is reasonable to assume that farmer plans his production quantity
with the intention to sell their crop in the open market. In other words, when deciding
on their production quantities, farmers do not know and will not anticipate a buyer will
offer any direct purchase contract. An alternative assumption could have been that contract
negotiations take place prior to the allocation decision so the farmer would know the effective
price for both crops. In the present context, however, the farmer makes the crop allocation
decision prior to any contract negotiations so that is the assumption we make here.
Given a production capacity of cap, the farmer produces x units of the crop that has an
uncertain market price P and (cap− x) units of the crop that has a certain market price k.
The farmer will obtain an expected utility
E[U(f(P ))] = E(1− exp[−λ{(P − c)x+ (k − c)(cap− x)}])
where λ > 0 is the absolute risk averse factor that measures the degrees of risk-aversion of
the farmer and c is the unit production cost. Because P ∼ N(µ, σ2), we have
E[U(f(P ))] = 1− exp[−λ(µ− c)x− λ(k − c)(cap− x) + (λ2x2σ2)/2]
Hence, the certainty equivalence of the farmer’s expected utility is
pi0f (x) = (µ− c)x+ (k − c)(cap− x)−
λ
2
x2σ2.
In this case, the farmer’s optimal production quantity q = argmax{pi0f (x) : x ≤ cap}. By
considering the first-order condition, the farmer’s optimal production quantity q satisfies:
q = min
{
cap,
µ− k
λσ2
}
(1)
where q captures the tradeoff between producing the crop with stable price and the crop with
uncertain price. (Note that q = 0 if µ ≤ k. Hence, it suffices to focus on the case when µ > k
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so that q > 0.) Also, the certainty equivalence of the farmer’s expected utility for selling q
units to the firm without PGP is equal to pi0f , where pi
0
f = (µ− c)q+(k− c)(cap− q)− λ2q2σ2.
For ease of exposition, we can scale the margin (k− c) to 0 without loss of generality so that
the farmer’s certainty equivalence can be simplified as:
pi0f = (µ− c)q −
λ
2
q2σ2 (2)
with quantity
q = min
{
cap,
µ− c
λσ2
}
.
3.3 Buying Firm’s Purchase Quantity y
Given the farmer’s (optimal) production quantity q given in (1) that is based on the assump-
tion that the farmer did not know or anticipate the buying firm will offer a direct purchase
contract, how much should the firm purchase directly from this farmer?2 Here we consider
that the buying firm uses planning models to determine its requirement of r units over its
planning horizon (cf. Ahumuda and Villalobos, 2009). Because the firm is a large multi-
national company, it is reasonable to focus our analysis on the case when q < r, i.e., the
farmer(s) can provide less than the company’s requirements.3
3.4 Base Model
Knowing its requirement r and the farmer’s quantity q, the firm has to decide on the purchase
quantity y from the farmer, with y ≤ q. For ease of exposition, we first examine in Section
4 the case where the purchase quantity y is taken exogenously to be y = q. Later, in Section
5, we shall relax this assumption to the case where the purchase quantity y is determined
endogenously as a decision variable with y ≤ q.
In the base case, we consider the case when the firm purchases y = q units from the
farmer and the remainder (r− q) from the open market. In this case, its expected cost is: 4
pi0b = µq + µ(r − q) = µr. (3)
2The question is more meaningful when the firm is negotiating with a consortium or cooperative or
farmers. In Barilla’s case, the farmers communicate their equivalent of q.
3It can also be shown that the PGP contract will create and share value between the firm and the farmer
even when r ≤ q.
4Although there are taxes and/or commissions to intermediaries for facilitating the transactions between
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When the firm offers direct purchase contracts without PGP, the farmer can eliminate
his quantity risk but faces the risk of price uncertainty. Specifically, the farmer may effec-
tively abandon this particular crop by setting q ≈ 0 when the price uncertainty σ2 becomes
large. To ensure stable supply, the firm may need to offer the PGP contract to reduce the
farmer’s price risk (in addition to the pre-committed purchase quantity as stipulated in the
direct purchase contract). This observation motivates the following question: Will the PGP
contract benefit the farmer, the firm or both? We investigate this in the following section.
4 PGP Contract with Exogenous Purchase Quantity
We now examine the PGP contract for the case when the firm decides to purchase y = q
units from the farmer and purchase the remainder (r − q) from the open market, where the
production quantity q has already been decided by the farmer in advance without anticipating
the PGP contract.5 At the same time, the firm opens negotiations on a PGP contract.
4.1 No Upper Bound on α
We model the interaction between the firm and the farmer as a Stackelberg game and solve
it via backward induction. Specifically, the firm is the leader selecting g to minimize its
expected cost and the farmer is the follower choosing the proportion α to maximize his
certainty equivalence. In this base model, we consider the case when the buying firm does
not impose an upper bound on α.
For any given guaranteed price g, the farmer chooses α that maximizes his certainty
equivalence. By considering the fact that farmer’s profit equals [αg + (1 − α)P − c]q, that
E(αg+ (1−α)P ) = (αg+ (1−α)µ), and that V (αg+ (1−α)P ) = (1−α)2σ2, the farmer’s
problem can be formulated as:
pif (g) = max
α∈[0,1]
[αg + (1− α)µ− c] q − λ
2
(1− α)2q2σ2, (4)
the firm and the farmer or for aggregating the farmers’ produce, we ignore these transaction costs for ease
of exposition. However, our analysis and the result would continue to hold even if we were to incorporate
these commissions.
5We shall extend our based model to the case when the farmer sets his production quantity q in antici-
pation of the PGP contract, and we shall show that the PGP contract continues to be mutually beneficial.
The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for suggesting this extension.
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where the optimal proportion α∗(g) satisfies:
α∗(g) = 1−
(
µ− g
λσ2
)
1
q
. (5)
We make three observations from (5). First, the optimal proportion α∗(g) increases in
the guaranteed price g, the firm’s purchase quantity q, and the price variance σ2. Second,
the farmer will set his proportion α∗(g) = 1 when the guaranteed price g ≥ µ and α∗(g) = 0
when g ≤ µ − λσ2q. The firm is interested in minimizing its purchasing cost so there is no
incentive for the firm to offer g > µ. Also, the firm is interested in enticing the farmer to
accept the PGP contract so that there is no incentive to set g < µ − λσ2q. Therefore, it
suffices to consider the case when g ∈ [µ − λσ2q, µ]. Finally, the farmer will participate in
the PGP contract only if he is better off relative to the case without PGP. In other words,
the participation constraint pif (g) ≥ pi0f for the farmer must be satisfied, where pif (g) is given
in (4) and pi0f is given in (2). We state this as:
Lemma 1 When the guaranteed price g ∈ [µ−λσ2q, µ], the participation constraint pif (g) ≥
pi0f is satisfied.
A proof for this lemma and as well as proofs of subsequent propositions are provided in
the Appendix. Anticipating farmer’s participation (Lemma 1) and farmer’s response α∗(g)
as stated in (5), the firm determines g∗ that minimizes its expected cost as follows:
pib = min
g∈[µ−λσ2q,µ]
[α∗(g)g + {1− α∗(g)}µ] q + µ(r − q) (6)
By substituting α∗(g) given in (5) and by considering the first order condition, it is easy to
check that the optimal guaranteed price g∗ satisfies:
g∗ = µ− λ
2
σ2q. (7)
Also, notice that g∗ is feasible because g∗ ∈ [µ− λσ2q, µ].
Being risk averse, the farmer is willing to accept the guaranteed price g∗ < µ, which is
below the expected market price. Substituting g∗ into (4), (5) and (6), we obtain:
Proposition 1 Under the PGP contract, the buying firm will set its guaranteed price g∗ =
µ − λ
2
σ2q and the farmer will select his proportion α∗ = 1
2
in equilibrium. The farmer’s
certainty equivalence pi∗f = (µ− c)q − 3λ8 σ2q2, and the firm’s expected cost pi∗b = µr − λ4σ2q2.
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Comparing the farmer’s certainty equivalence and the firm’s expected cost under the guaran-
teed price contract with the case when the firm and the farmer engage in the direct purchase
contract without PGP as presented in Section 2, we get
Corollary 1 The PGP contract is mutually beneficial: the farmer will increase his expected
certainty equivalence by pi∗f − pi0f = λ8σ2q2 > 0 and the firm will reduce its expected cost by
λ
4
σ2q2 as pi∗b − pi0b = −λ4σ2q2 < 0.
Corollary 1 implies that the PGP contract creates value for both parties. This is not
surprising as we have a risk-averse supplier and a risk-neutral buyer. The farmer can reduce
his risk by selling half of the purchase quantity (i.e., α∗ = 0.5) at a guaranteed price g∗ ==
µ− λ
2
σ2q at the time of sowing and selling the remaining half at market price P after harvest.
Effectively, this means the farmer is buying ‘insurance’ offered by the buying firm. At the
same time, the firm can take advantage of the fact that the risk-averse farmer will accept
a guaranteed price g∗ that is below the expected market price µ so it can enjoy a lower
expected cost in equilibrium besides having a guaranteed supply q. This benefit can be
viewed as the buying firm receiving an insurance premium from the farmer. Therefore both
‘insured’ and ‘insurer’ are better off.6
As a result, at the end of the contract negotiations, the two parties can agree on a PGP
contract with the following terms: the quantity y to be purchased equal to the the farmer’s
intended production q, the buying firm’s guaranteed price g, and the proportion α∗ of the
quantity that would be purchased at the guaranteed price at the time of delivery after harvest
(Figure 1).
4.2 Extension 1: When the Buyer Imposes an Upper Limit on α
We now extend our base model to the case when the buyer wants to limit its exposure to
price risk. Specifically, the buyer would impose an upper bound b ≤ 1 so that on α ≤ b. For
example, b = 0.3 in the Barilla case. For any given g, the farmer’s problem given in (4) can
6If the buying firm accounts for the aforementioned commissions charged by the intermediaries, it benefits
from an even lower effective cost.
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be modified as:
pif (g) = max
α∈[0,b]
[αg + (1− α)µ− c] q − λ
2
(1− α)2q2σ2. (8)
Because the objective fucntion is concave in α, we can use the first order condition to show
that the optimal proportion α∗(g) satisfies:
α∗(g) = min{1−
(
µ− g
λσ2
)
1
q
, b}. (9)
By using the same agrument as in the base case, it is sufficient to focus on the case
when g ∈ [µ − λσ2q, µ − (1 − b)λσ2q] to ensure that α∗(g) ∈ [0, b]. Because the range
[µ−λσ2q, µ− (1− b)λσ2q] is a subset of the range [µ−λσ2q, µ], Lemma 1 continues to hold
so that the participation constraint pif (g) ≥ pi0f is satisfied. In this case, we can determine
the optimal g∗ by solving the buyer’s problem (akin to (6)) as:
pib = min
g∈[µ−λσ2q,µ−(1−b)λσ2q]
[α∗(g)g + {1− α∗(g)}µ] q + µ(r − q) (10)
By substituting α∗(g) given in (9) and by considering the first order condition, it is easy to
check that the optimal guaranteed price g∗ satisfies:
g∗ = min{µ− 0.5λσ2q, µ− (1− b)λσ2q}. (11)
Substituting g∗ into (8), (9) and (10), we obtain the following result:
Corollary 2 When the buyer imposes an upper limit b on α under the PGP contract, the
buying firm will set its guaranteed price g∗ = min{µ − 0.5λσ2q, µ − (1 − b)λσ2q} and
the farmer will select his proportion α∗ = min{0.5, b}. Also, when b ≥ 0.5, the farmer’s
certainty equivalence pi∗f = (µ− c)q − 3λ8 σ2q2, the firm’s expected cost pi∗b = µr − λ4σ2q2, and
the results stated in Corollary 1 holds. Also, when b < 0.5, pi∗f = (µ− c)q − 1−b
2
2
λσ2q2, and
the firm’s expected cost pi∗b = µr − b(1 − b)λσ2q2. Furthermore, pi∗f − pi0f = b
2
2
λσ2q2 > 0 and
pi∗b − pi0b = −b(1− b)λσ2q2 < 0.
Corollary 2 implies that, even when the buyer imposes an upper limit b on α, the PGP
contract continues to be mutually beneficial.
14
4.3 Extension 2: When the Farmer Selects q in Anticipation of
the PGP Contract
We now extend our base model to the case when the farmer selects q in anticipation of
the PGP contract.7 This situation can occur when the buyer sends a credible message (or
makes a commitment) to the farmer about the PGP contract. With a credible message, the
farmer and the buyer engage in a 3-stage game as follows. The farmer first selects q based
on the belief that the buyer will offer the PGP contract, then the buyer sets her partially
guaranteed price g, and finally, the farmer sets his proportion α. In this subsection, we shall
focus on the case when the buyer sends a credible message to the farmer.8 Also, we shall
examine whether it is beneficial for the buyer to send a credible message to the farmer about
the PGP contract in advance.
When the farmer believes that the buyer will offer the PGP contract, the farmer can
anticipate that the buyer will offer the PGP contract by setting g∗ = µ − λ
2
σ2q for any
q selected by the farmer, the farmer will select his proportion α∗ = 1
2
, and the farmer’s
certainty equivalence pi∗f (q) = (µ − c)q − 3λ8 σ2q2 for any given q as stated in Proposition 1.
In the event when the farmer can anticipate the buyer will offer the PGP contract when
he decides on q, the farmer can select his production quantity q by solving the following
problem:
pi∗f = max
q≤cap
(µ− c)q − 3λ
8
σ2q2, (12)
where cap is the production capacity as explained in Section 3.1. By considering the first or-
der condition , it is easy to check that the optimal production quantity q∗ = min
{
cap, 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
}
.
Relative to the production quantity for the case when the farmer does not anticipate the
PGP contract as given in (1), where q = min
{
cap, (µ−c)
λσ2
}
, we can conclude that the farmer
will produce more if he can anticipate that the buyer will offer the PGP contract.
7The authors thank the reviewers for suggesting this extension.
8We do not consider the case when the buyer knows the state of the market condition but the farmer
knows only about the probability of different states. When there is information asymmetry, the buyer’s
message can be blurred and the farmer can only update his belief about the state of the market using the
Bayes rule. This setting can be modeled as a “cheap talk” game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), which requires
a completely different set up. In addition, the analysis of a cheap talk game is highly complex and there are
multiple equilibria. For this reason, the analysis of a cheap talk game is beyond the scope of this paper, and
we shall defer this case as future research.
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Also, through substitution of q∗ into the results as stated in Proposition 1 and direct
comparison, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 3 When the farmer can anticipate the PGP contract when he sets his production
quantity, he will set his production quantity q∗ = min
{
cap, 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
}
, the buyer will offer
the guaranteed price g∗ = µ− λ
2
σ2q∗, and the farmer will select his proportion α∗ = 1
2
. Also,
when cap ≥ 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
, the farmer’s certainty equivalence pi∗f =
2
3
· (µ−c)2
λσ2
> pi0f and the buyer’s
expected cost pi∗b = µr − 49 · (µ−c)
2
λσ2
< pi0b .
Corollary 3 reveals that, when the farmer can anticipate that the buyer will offer the PGP
contract, he will produce more; i.e., q∗ ≥ q. Also, the PGP contract continues to be mutually
beneficial, creating a win-win solution for the farmer and the buyer.
Next, we examine whether it is beneficial for the buyer to send a credible message about
the PGP contract before the farmer selects his production quantity. For ease of exposition, let
us consider the case when cap ≥ 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
. In this case, we can apply(1) to show that q = (µ−c)
λσ2
.
By substituting q into Proposition 1, we can show that, when the farmer cannot anticipate
the PGP contract, the farmer’s profit is equal to 5
8
· (µ−c)2
λσ2
and the buyer’s expected cost is
equal to µr− 1
4
· (µ−c)2
λσ2
. By comparing these two quantities with those stated in Corollary 3,
we can conclude that both the buyer and the farmer can benefit even more from the PGP
contract when the buyer can send a credible message about the PGP contract before the
farmer selects his production quantity.
5 PGP Contract with Endogenous Purchase Quantity
We now consider the case when the firm’s purchase quantity y is a decision variable with
y ≤ q that is endogenous to the negotiating process. In this case, the firm has to determine
its purchase quantity y from the farmer and its guaranteed unit price g. For any given (y, g),
the farmer would need to sell his extra units [q− y]+ on the open market accordingly to the
ex-ante uncertain market price P . At the same time, the farmer has to decide the proportion
α of the purchase quantity y to be paid according to g and the rest according to the realized
P .
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The farmer sells y ≤ q units to the firm according to the effective unit price (αg+(1−α)P )
and the remaining (q − y) units on the open market at unit price P . Taking into account
the unit production cost c, the farmer’s profit is equal to [αg + (1− α)P ]y + P (q − y)− cq.
Because P ∼ N(µ, σ2), the farmer’s certainty equivalence for any given α is:
pif (α) = [αg + (1− α)µ] · y + µ(q − y)− cq − λσ
2
2
· (q − αy)2. (13)
Similarly, when the firm purchases y units from the farmer and the remaining (r − y) units
from the open market, it is easy to show that the buyer’s expected cost satisfies:
pib = [αg + (1− α)µ] · y + µ · (r − y). (14)
We now analyze the Stackelberg game that corresponds to the case when the buying
firm chooses its purchase quantity y and offers the guaranteed unit price g – in response, the
farmer selects his proportion α. It can be shown that there exists an equilibrium under which
the firm will purchase exactly y∗ = q units from the farmer and purchase the remaining (r−q)
units from the open market. Consequently, we can apply the result from the previous section
to show that the PGP contract will continue to create mutual benefits for both parties when
the purchase quantity y is not exogenous but rather a decision variable. We state this as:
Proposition 2 There are multiple equilibria that yield the same payoff for the firm and the
farmer when (a) the firm chooses its purchase quantity y and guaranteed unit price g and
(b) the farmer is allowed sell his extra (q− y) units on the open market. Among these, there
exists one equilibrium under which y∗ = q and g∗ = µ− λ
2
σ2q as given in equation (7) with
the PGP contract increasing utility for both the firm and the farmer.
Proposition 2 points to an equilibrium in which the firm purchases the entire crop (i.e.,
y∗ = q) from the farmer when the firm chooses both purchase quantity y ≤ q and guaranteed
unit price g. Thus, the results presented in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 continue to hold
when the purchase quantity is no longer exogenous and the PGP contract continues to create
benefits for both the farmer and the buying firm.
For the remainder of this paper we therefore limit ourself to examining the value of the
PGP contract associated only with the exogenous case with y = q.
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6 PGP Contract with Contractually Required Advi-
sory Services
Now consider adding the required use of advisory services, free to the farmer, as part of the
contract. While we expect the farmer’s utility to improve further, but we need to better
understand how the equilibrium shifts to the advantage of both parties.
Suppose, as a result of the agricultural advisory services, the farmer reduces his unit
production cost from c to δc (with δ ∈ (0, 1]) and increases his yield from 1 to (1 + ) (with
 ∈ [0, 1]).9 For clarity, we scale the purchase quantity q to 1 to focus on the value of the
advisory services.
While the setting is the same as the base case with q = 1, a key difference here is that the
farmer now can produce (1 + ) units. If the firm is willing to purchase the extra production
, then we can simply replace q(= 1) by (1+), replace c by δc, and then apply Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 to show that the PGP will create mutual benefits. This observation motivates
us to consider an alternative scenario in which the firm is not willing to purchase the extra
production . However, the contract allows the farmer to sell his “extra” production  (due
to the improved yield) on the open market and obtain additional revenue.
Therefore, for any given guaranteed unit price g (offered by the firm) and proportion α
(selected by the farmer), the farmer’s profit associated with the case when q = 1 is equal to
[αg + (1− α)P ] + P − δc,
where the first term in square brackets represents the revenue to be obtained from the firm
when q = 1, the second term is the additional revenue generated from the extra production
 due to yield improvement, and the third term represents the reduced production cost.
Throughout this section, we use the notation x˜ to denote quantity x associated with
the case when the firm offers agricultural advisory services in addition to the guaranteed
price g under the PGP contract. By using the fact that E(P ) = µ and V ar(P ) = σ2,
we can determine the certainty equivalence of the farmer’s profit. Therefore, for any given
9For ease of exposition, we consider the cases when δ ∈ (0, 1] and  ∈ [0, 1] that are commonly observed
in practice. However, the same approach can be used to analyze the case when δ > 1 and/or  > 1. Also,
we assume that δ and  are deterministic for simplicity; however, the analysis can be extended to the case
when these two parameters are stochastic.
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guaranteed price g, the farmer’s problem is:
p˜if (g) = max
α∈[0,1]
((αg + (1− α + )µ)− δc)− λ
2
(1− α + )2σ2, (15)
where the optimal proportion α˜∗(g) satisfies:
α˜(g) = 1 + − µ− g
λσ2
= + α∗(g) (16)
where α∗(g) is given in (5) with q = 1.
Relative to the base PGP case in Section 4, (16) shows that the farmer would take advan-
tage of the PGP contract by shifting the price risk to the firm by increasing his proportion
α∗ earlier to α∗+  now when he is allowed to sell his extra production  on the open market.
By using the same argument as for the base PGP case, the buying firm can now offer a lower
price g ∈ [µ− (1 + )λσ2, µ− λσ2] so that α˜(g) ∈ [0, 1].
For exposition, we assume that µ ≥ 2λσ2 so that the range [µ − (1 + )λσ2, µ − λσ2]
associated with g is always non-negative for any  ∈ [0, 1]. Next, we examine the condition
under which the farmer’s participation constraint p˜if (g) ≥ pi0f holds, where p˜if (g) is given in
(15) and pi0f is given in (2):
Lemma 2 For any guaranteed price g ∈ [µ−(1+)λσ2, µ−λσ2], the participation constraint
p˜if (g) ≥ pi0f is always satisfied.
Knowing the farmer will always participate in the PGP contract as per Lemma 2 and the
farmer’s response α˜∗(g) is given in (16), the firm determines g˜∗ that minimizes its expected
cost (for purchasing q = 1 unit from the farmer and the remaining (r − 1) units from the
open market) by solving:
p˜i∗b = min
g∈[µ−(1+)λσ2,µ−λσ2]
(α˜(g)g + (1− α˜(g))µ) + µ(r − 1). (17)
By substituting α˜(g) given in (16) and by considering the first order condition, we obtain
the optimal guaranteed price:
g˜∗ = µ− (1 + )λ
2
σ2. (18)
Comparing the guaranteed price g∗ for the base case in (7) (for the case when q = 1) and
g˜∗ for this case in (18), we note that the firm would lower its guaranteed price further when
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the it offers free advice to the farmer for improving yield. This result is due to the fact that
the farmer is allowed to sell his extra production  on the open market, which creates an
opportunity for the firm to extract some of the value created by offering a lower guaranteed
price g˜∗ as the yield  improves.
By substituting g˜∗ into (16), we can retrieve the optimal proportion that the farmer
selects in equilibrium:
α˜∗ =
1 + 
2
. (19)
As noted earlier, the farmer would take advantage of the PGP contract by increasing his
proportion so that he can shift some of the price risk associated with the sales of his extra
production  to the firm. By substituting the optimal g˜∗ and α˜∗ into (15) and (17), we
obtain:
Proposition 3 When the firm offers free advisory service on top of the PGP contract, it
will set its guaranteed price g˜∗ as given in (18) and the farmer will select his proportion α˜∗
as given in equation (19) in equilibrium. The farmer’s certain equivalence then is
p˜i∗f = (1 + )µ− δc−
3
8
λσ2(1 + )2 (20)
and the firm’s expected cost is
p˜i∗b = µ−
λσ2
4
(1 + )2 (21)
Note that Proposition 3 reduces to Proposition 1 when  = 0 and δ = 1. Comparing
Propositions 1 and 3 for the case when q = 1, we obtain:
Corollary 4 When the firm offers free advisory service on top of the PGP contract, it creates
additional mutual benefit in equilibrium: the farmer can increase his certainty equivalence,
i.e., p˜i∗f > pi
∗
f , and the firm can further reduce its expected cost, i.e., p˜i
∗
b < pi
∗
b .
Corollary 4 isolates the additional benefits created by the (free) advisory services offered
by the firm through three operational factors: (1) the farmer can sell the extra production
in the open market after harvest; (2) the farmer can shift some of the price risk associated
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with the extra production to the firm by increasing his proportion; and (3) the firm can take
advantage of the extra production by lowering its guaranteed price further relative to the
base case.
Considering Corollary 1 and Corollary 4 together, we conclude that (a) the PGP contract
creates shared value by sharing price risk as stated in Corollary 1, and (b) free advisory
services provide further mutual benefit by balancing the risk associated with the sales of the
extra production. Thus, our analysis offers an economic rationale for why such multinational
agri-food firms as Barilla, Nestle´, Starbucks and Walmart are not only establishing direct
contracts with farmers but also why they are additionally offering free advisory service to
these farmers.
7 Guaranteed Price Premium for ‘Sustainability’ Com-
pliance
Many firms provide incentives for farmers to comply with farming practices that can reduce
the harmful effects of agricultural practice on the environment. Such practices include the
use of composted plant material or animal manure to enrich soil and the use of ladybugs
and spiders to control agricultural pests to decrease the use of chemicals (Gold 2009). We
examine the case when a firm such as Barilla (Formentini et al. 2014) or Starbucks (Lee
2007) offers a price premium h to farmers who comply with ‘sustainable’, ‘organic’, or meeting
the requirements of a third-party certification body or indeed any other desirable farming
practices required by the buying firm.
Complying with these requirements is costly for the farmer. Given the contract quantity
q = 1 and the guaranteed price g, the farmer needs to decide on the proportion α to be paid
at g as before. In addition, if the buying firm offers a price premium h proportional to the
fraction γ that complies with the practices specified by the firm, the farmer has to decide
on this fraction.10 This form of linear price premium is commonly observed in practice. For
example, Lee (2007) reported that, under the C.A.F.E. program, Starbuck’s offers $0.05 per
10The same reasoning holds when there are multiple farmers negotiating as a consortium, as in the case
of Barilla, and some farmers choose to be fully compliant and others fully non-compliant. In that case, γ
would refer to the produce of the compliant farmers.
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pound of coffee beans when the farmer complies with the sustainable agricultural practice
as specified. As a result of the compliance effort, we suppose he incurs a compliance cost
kγ2 associated with the proportion γ, which lowers his effective selling price. The expected
value of his effective selling price is then αg + (1 − α)µ + (hγ − kγ2) and the variance is
(1− α)2σ2. The farmer seeks to maximize his certainty equivalence as:
pif (g, h) = Maxα∈[0,1],γ∈[0,1] (αg + (1− α)µ− c− λ
2
(1− α)2σ2) + (hγ − kγ2).
Observe that the farmer’s problem is separable in α and γ and the first subproblem,
pif (g) = max
α∈[0,1]
(αg + (1− α)µ− c− λ
2
(1− α)2σ2)
is identical to the farmer’s problem as presented in Section 3 with q = 1. Hence, all results
stated in Section 3 continue to hold for the first subproblem: the PGP contract creates
shared value for the farmer and the firm.
It suffices therefore to focus on the second subproblem associated with the price premium
for compliance. First consider the farmer:
pif (h) = max
γ∈[0,1]
(hγ − kγ2). (22)
The optimal proportion then is:
γ∗(h) =
h
2k
(23)
Hence, the farmer will choose a larger proportion to comply with the guidelines when the
firm offers a higher premium h. Also, by using the same argument presented earlier, it is
sufficient to consider the case when h ∈ [0, 2k] so that γ∗(h) ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting γ∗(h) into
the objective function given in (22), we get
pif (h) =
h2
4k
> 0
Thus, price premium creates additional value for the farmer to comply with the guidelines.
The firm anticipates the farmer’s response γ∗(h) in equation (23) and seeks to determine
h∗ to minimize its expected relevant cost that includes the premium payment γ∗(h)h as well
as a posited social cost (a− bγ∗(h)) that decreases with the proportion of compliance γ∗(h)
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selected by the farmer. Social cost is loss of brand value, which in turn is loss of future
sales and margin. Another way to say this would be that the brand value of the buying firm
increases with the proportion of compliance γ∗(h). Using diverse case studies, Lefevre et al.
(2010: p.4) quantify brand value and other social costs avoided (or benefits obtained from
such efforts) as a percentage of revenue. Either way, there is potential reduction in margin
in the future and for convenience we term it as a cost for the buying firm. Note that brand
value is particularly important for agri-food companies that face the consumer by making
or selling consumer goods. One category we have not included in the relevant cost is that of
monitoring by the company to ensure the farmer is not cheating, i.e., claiming compliance
without putting in the effort to ensure it – we relegate this to future research (but see Kvaløy
2006).
With its relevant cost in mind, the firm solves the following problem:
pib = min
h∈[0,2k]
γ∗(h)h+ {a− bγ∗(h)}, (24)
By substituting γ∗(h) given in (23) and by considering the first order condition along with
the bound on h, it is easy to check that the optimal premium h∗ satisfies:
h∗ = min
{
b
2
, 2k
}
. (25)
Substituting h∗ into (23), (24) and (22), we obtain:
Proposition 4 When the firm offer guaranteed premium to entice farmers to comply with
certain agricultural practices, the firm will set a price premium h∗ = min{ b
2
, 2k} and the
farmer will select his proportion γ∗ = min{ b
4k
, 1} in equilibrium. The farmer’s certainty
equivalence (associated with this price premium) then is:
pi∗f =
{
b2
16k
if b < 4k
k if b ≥ 4k.
and the firm’s expected social cost (associated with the price premium) is:
pi∗b =
{
a− b2
8k
if b < 4k
a− b+ 2k if b ≥ 4k.
Proposition 4 shows that, with compliance premium, the farmer obtains additional cer-
tainty equivalence on top of the certainty equivalence that the farmer obtains through the
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PGP contract. Without such a premium, the farmer has no incentive to comply and will set
γ = 0 so that the firm’s social cost is equal to a. In this case, Proposition 4 implies that
the buying firm can lower its social cost by providing the premium. Thus the compliance
premium h∗ is mutually beneficial: it entices the farmer to increase his compliance level so
that he can increase his certainty equivalence and the firm can reduce its social cost. Hence,
we can state:
Corollary 5 When the firm offers a price premium for compliance on top of a PGP contract,
both parties benefit from the PGP contract. Also, the premium bonus creates additional
mutual benefit over and above the basic PGP contract: the farmer can further increase his
expected certainty equivalence and the firm can further reduce its social cost and therefore its
total relevant cost.
The result stated in Corollary 5 is consistent with the results Barilla has obtained. Specif-
ically, Barilla has managed to reduce its carbon footprint by 30%, reduce farmer’s production
cost by 30% and increase farmer’s production yield by 20%. The company attributes these
to the successful implementation of the PGP contract and its incentive for farmers to adopt
sustainable agricultural practices. This has led to Barilla getting the European CSR Award
in 2013 for its efforts for durum wheat.
8 Conclusion
Motivated by the contracts being offered by Barilla and SABMiller to farmers in lieu of pur-
chasing from the open market, we examined the partially guaranteed price or PGP contract.
We modeled the interaction of the buying firm and the farmer as a Stackelberg game and
showed that the PGP contract creates shared value for the firm and the farmer whether
the purchase quantity is given as an exogenous quantity or it is endogenously determined as
part of the negotiation process. We also considered additional aspects of such contracts in
practice including the use of advisory services and incentives for ‘sustainable’ agricultural
practices. For these we showed that the PGP contract is beneficial to both parties when
advisory service is involved and when incentives are provided for sustainable agricultural
practices.
24
While the key insight that both sides of the contract win follows simply from the fact
that the buyer is risk-neutral and the supplier is risk-averse, we have shown how the dy-
namics between the buying firm and the farmer play out in the context of contract farming.
Moreover, we have shown that this key insight is robust even with advisory services and
incentives.
Thus, our analysis enables us to gain a better understanding about how the PGP contract
creates value for both parties. The risk-averse farmer’s situation is relatively straightforward:
he gains by facing reduced price risk by ‘pre-selling’ a portion of the purchase quantity at
the guaranteed price under the PGP contract and the remaining at the market price – the
incentives and the premiums only add to his gain.
The benefit for the buying firm is more involved. Essentially, the risk-neutral firm can
reduce its purchase cost by setting its guaranteed price (slightly) below the expected market
price so it gains. Recall our earlier comment that this is akin to the firm offering insurance
to the farmer, who in turns pays an insurance premium to the buying firm. When the
firm offers advisory services, the farmer gains further and because of this extra benefit, the
farmer would be willing to accept an even lower guaranteed price than before, which lowers
the firm’s expected cost. Finally, when the firm offers a price premium to the farmer for
sustainable agricultural practices, the firm can reduce its total relevant cost by reducing its
social cost (or by improving its brand value) associated with the farmer’s compliance.
There are managerial implications: As these contracts create win-win situations for both
farmers and buying firms, there needs to be greater use of such contracts at least for agri-
cultural commodities sold by small farmers. As interest grows in sustainability, the use of
such contracts becomes all the more important. Large companies buying in bulk volume
cannot deal directly with small farmers, hence their attraction to commodity markets. In
Barilla’s case, the farmers form consortia and Barilla works with multiple such consortia at
the same time. Such contracts make sense especially where we have small farmers and there
is a good way to aggregate farmers as well as their produce. Finally, if a firm is going for
PGP contracts, it might as well provide advisory services.
Still, this paper is only an initial attempt to analyze the PGP contract in the context
of creating value for both sides. There are extensions one can explore in the near future:
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First, we assumed that the farmer’s production yield is deterministic. (Although production
yield is uncertain in general, this case the output is quite close to expected on account of
the control of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides by Barilla.) Therefore, it is of interest to
establish a contract that can create shared value when the farmer faces uncertain market
price and uncertain yield, and the firm faces uncertain market price and uncertain demand
(Tang et al., 2014). It may be interesting to explore options in this regard (cf. Spinler and
Huchzermeier, 2006) and also to look at other types of contracts with a single dominant
buyer (cf. Lau et al 2008).
Second, many firms such as RML are disseminating market information to farmers at a
subscription price so that they can obtain a more accurate forecast about the future market
price (Aker, 2010; Fafchamps and Minten, 2012; Mittal and Mehar, 2012). It would be
interesting to establish a subscription pricing contract rather than free advisory services
that can create a win-win situation for both the farmer and the company providing the
information service.
Third, when dealing with agricultural practices, in this paper we assumed that the farmer
is honest in sticking to the terms of the contract and/or the firm can verify the farmer’s
effort accurately without any cost. However, as mentioned by Babich and Tang (2012) and
Plambeck and Taylor (2014), the farmer may cheat by side-selling when the market price
is higher than the contracted price and therefore deliver less quantity to the buying firm.
With hidden information and hidden actions, it would be useful to develop a mechanism in
the contract that would generate mutual benefit. The farmer could also potentially cheat by
fraudulently claiming compliance in order to save costs but still claim the incentive. This
requires the buying firm to invest in monitoring, resulting in higher total relevant cost. This
too needs to be studied as part of future research.
Finally, this paper has focused on the economic benefits to both parties. This work needs
to be extended to measures of social benefits to the communities in which the farmers live
and work. These benefits can in turn be tied to the goodwill of consumers of the products
made by the buying company.
All in all, sustainability contracts are vitally important to all players in the agro-food
sector: consumers, farmers, farming communities and buying companies! We hope this paper
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will encourage further research on such contracts in this as well as other sectors.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: By substituting α∗(g) into the objective function given in (4), we get:
pif (g) = (g − c)q + λσ22 ·
(
µ−g
λσ2
)2
. By considering (2), the participation constraint pif (g) ≥ pi0f
holds when:
gq − cq + λσ
2
2
·
(
µ− g
λσ2
)2
≥ µq − cq − λσ2q2
λσ2
2
q2 − (µ− g)q + λσ
2
2
·
(
µ− g
λσ2
)2
≥ 0
λσ2
2
· (q −
(
µ− g
λσ2
)
)2 ≥ 0.
The last equation proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1: By substituting g∗ given in (7) into (5), we get α∗ = 0.5. Then
we can show the rest by direct substitution of α∗ and g∗ into (4) and (6).
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Proof of Corollary 1: Recall that the farmer’s certainty equivalence pi0f = (µ− λ2σ2q− c)q
where there is no contract. Compare this with the farmer’s certain equivalence pi∗f = (µ −
3λ
8
σ2q − c)q under the guaranteed price contract, we can check that the difference is λ
8
σ2q2.
This proves the first statement. The second statement can be easily obtained in the same
manner.
Proof of Corollary 2: The proof follows the same approach as presented in the proof of
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we omit the details.
Proof of Corollary 3: When cap ≥ 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
, the farmer’s production quantity q∗ = 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
,
the buyer’s guaranteed price g∗ = µ − 2
3
(µ − c), and the farmer will select his proportion
α∗ = 1
2
. By substituting these quantities into the results as stated in Proposition 1, it can
be shown that: pi∗f =
4
3
· µ−c
2λσ2
. At the same time, by substituting q given in (1) into (2), it is
easy to check that pi0f =
µ−c
2λσ2
. Hence, we can conclude that pi∗f =
4
3
pi0f > pi
0
f . Next, through
substitution, it is easy to check that pi∗b = µr− 49 · µ−cλσ2 < µr = pi0b . This completes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: For any given (y, g) selected by the firm, let us examine the
farmer’s best response α∗(y, g). Because q ≥ y, we can use (13) to show that the farmer’s
problem can be formulated as:
pif = max
α
[αg + (1− α)µ] · y + µ(q − y)− cq − λσ
2
2
· (q − αy)2. (26)
By considering the first order condition, it is easy to check that α∗ = min{ q
y
− (µ−g
λσ2
)
1
y
, 1},
which converges to (5) when y = q. We have two cases to consider.
Case 1 with g ≥ µ − (q − y)λσ2. In this case, it is easy to check that α∗ = 1. Combine
this observation and the fact that q ≥ y, we can use (14) to show that the buyer solves the
following problem miny≤q ming≥µ−(q−y)λσ2 gy+µ(r−y). First, for any given y ≤ q, it is easy
to check that the optimal g∗(y) = µ − (q − y)λσ2. Through substitution, it can be shown
that the remaining buyer’s problem is: miny≤q (µr− λσ2(q− y)y). Hence, it is easy to show
that y∗ = q/2. Through substitution, we get g∗ = µ− λ
2
σ2q, pi∗b = µr − λσ2(q/2)2 < pi0b and
pi∗f = pi
0
f +
λσ2
2
· (q/2)2 > pi0f .
Case 2 with g ≤ µ − (q − y)λσ2. In this case, it is easy to check from above that α∗ =
q
y
− (µ−g
λσ2
)
1
y
. Combine this observation and the fact that q ≥ y, we can use (14) to show that
the buyer solves the following problem miny≤q ming≤µ−(q−y)λσ2 {gy −
(
µ−g
λσ2
) · g + µy − µq +
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(
µ−g
λσ2
) ·µ+µ(r−y)} and the optimal g∗ = µ− λσ2
2
q when q/2 ≤ y ≤ q and g∗ = µ−(q−y)λσ2
when q/2 > y. So, we need to examine two scenarios:
• Scenario a: q/2 ≤ y ≤ q In this case, g∗ = µ− λσ2
2
q and the corresponding α∗ = q
2y
.
Through substitution, we get: the firm’s expected cost for any given y is equal to
µr− λσ2
2
· q2
2
, which is independent of y. Hence, we can conclude that, when q/2 ≤ y ≤ q,
there exists an equilibrium that y∗ = q so that pi∗b = µr − λσ2 · (q/2)2 < pi0b . Similarly,
we can show that the farmer’s certainty equivalence pi∗f = pi
0
f +
λσ2
2
· (q/2)2 > pi0f .
• Scenario b: q/2 ≥ y. In this case, g∗ = µ − (q − y)λσ2 and the corresponding
α∗ = 1. This corresponds to Case 1 as stated above. Specifically, we get y∗ = q/2.
Through substitution, we get g∗ = µ − λ
2
σ2q, pi∗b = µr − λσ2(q/2)2 < pi0b and pi∗f =
pi0f +
λσ2
2
· (q/2)2 > pi0f .
By combining the results, we have shown that there exists an equilibrium such that the
buyer purchase y∗ = q in equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2: By substituting α˜(g) into the objective function given in (15), we
get: p˜if (g) = g + g − δc + λσ22 ·
(
µ−g
λσ2
)2
. By considering (2), the participation constraint
p˜if (g) ≥ pi0f holds if g+ g− δc+ λσ
2
2
· (µ−g
λσ2
)2 ≥ µ− c−λσ2. This condition can be simplified
as [g + (1 − δ)c] · 2
λσ2
+ (1 − (µ−g
λσ2
)
)2 > 0, which holds because δ ≤ 1. This proves the
statement.
Proof of Proposition 3: The expressions are obtained by direct substitution. We omit
the details.
Proof of Corollary 3: When cap ≥ 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
, the farmer’s production quantity q∗ = 4
3
· (µ−c)
λσ2
,
the buyer’s guaranteed price g∗ = µ − 2
3
(µ − c), and the farmer will select his proportion
α∗ = 1
2
. By substituting these quantities into the results as stated in Proposition 1, it can
be shown that: pi∗f =
4
3
· µ−c
2λσ2
. At the same time, by substituting q given in (1) into (2), it is
easy to check that pi0f =
(µ−c)2
2λσ2
. Hence, we can conclude that pi∗f =
4
3
pi0f > pi
0
f . Next, through
substitution, it is easy to check that pi∗b = µr − 49 · (µ−c)
2
λσ2
< µr = pi0b . This completes our
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4: The result can be obtained immediately by substituting g∗ into
(23), (22) and (24). We omit the details.
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